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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE

CURRENT PATTERNS

December 1955

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SUMMARY

The leadership in the USSR has adopted a new set of tactics for Soviet foreign policy and for the Communist Parties and fronts in the Free World. Some of the elements in this new international line can be traced back to the Stalin-Malenkov period, but were not crystallized or effectively implemented until 1955. The new line is expansionist in purpose. It is designed to relax the vigilance and break up the defensive unity of the Free World, to weaken anti-Communist resistance on both international and national levels, and to strengthen the "socialist camp" by winning the sympathy of "neutralist" countries and exploiting conflicts of interest within the Free World.

In foreign affairs, the USSR seeks to create a general impression that it is willing to negotiate for the peaceful solution of all issues and strives to dispel fears of Communist state aggression. It has negotiated some secondary issues, but has continued intransigent on basic strategic issues. The Soviet leaders hope that the illusion of broad Soviet reasonableness will spread and will help to fragment the Free World. The new Soviet diplomatic tactics are focused mainly on Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

The Communist Parties and fronts within the Free World are reorienting their tactics to render maximum support to the new Soviet foreign policy and to secure maximum advantage from the hoped-for disintegration of Cold War alignments. The Communist Parties are reemphasizing the Marxist-Leninist principle of "class struggle" in order to avoid confusion during the period of extreme flexibility in Soviet diplomacy and to lay down the basis for a shift in tactics away from outworn Cold War international issues toward concentration on potentially more productive local issues. The Communist Parties have taken the cue to re-emphasize "class struggle" from policy statements of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They have made it clear that "peaceful coexistence" is strictly a tactic of Soviet foreign policy--that it refers to relations between states and not to a weakening of the "class struggle."

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In capitalist countries, this shift appears to be taking the form of greater stress on anti-capitalist, class-against-class issues, and is primarily directed towards winning Socialists and other non-Communist working-class elements. In the non-industrialized countries the strategy of "national liberation" continues without basic revision.

Tactical readjustment has been necessary in such countries as India, where the Soviet leaders have directed the CP to support Nehru's "neutralist" foreign policy. Some Latin American Communist Parties have perceptibly shifted away from propaganda attacks against the United States as a state toward attacks on specific, "class", manifestations of United States "imperialism."

The Soviet leaders have recently reinforced the principle of the use of armed struggle in the strategy of "national liberation" by encouraging the Latin American Communist Parties to work in the direction of armed action.

New techniques for promoting "unity in action" are being worked out. The Communist Parties and fronts are attempting to strengthen themselves organizationally in order to carry out their current tasks more effectively, and to prepare themselves, in the long run, for eventual seizures of power.

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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE: CURRENT PATTERNS

Introduction.

This is the first in a series of papers which will describe and analyze the developing tactical pattern of the International Communist Movement.

The emphasis in this series will be upon the tactics of the Communist Movement outside the Soviet-Chinese-Satellite Orbit--i.e., upon the tactics of the Communist Parties and fronts within the Free World. However, the tactics of all components of the International Movement represent an organic whole. To maintain proper perspective, therefore, it will always be necessary to set forth as background an analysis of the tactics of the directing force of the Movement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and its immediate arms: Soviet State (diplomacy) and Soviet clandestine services.

It will be especially necessary in this first issue to chart the direction and objectives of Soviet diplomacy as they have emerged so dramatically during the past year.

This first paper treats broadly with the pattern of tactics which has emerged during the period since the accession of the Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership in February, through September 1955. The treatment includes a few developments during October and early November which support the tentative conclusions reached on the basis of earlier observation. It is too soon to determine whether more recent Soviet statements indicate revisions of the observed pattern or the emergence of a new one.

From the evidence, it would appear that the new Communist tactical line was designed for a relatively long term. It has involved a broad shift in the tactics and world-view of the whole International Movement. Such shifts are not undertaken lightly by the Soviet leaders. As a tactic, it has taken the USSR several years to crystallize. The whole International Movement has not

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yet fully adjusted to it. It is a matter of historical record that Soviet tactics have sometimes required relatively long periods of internal assimilation and local adaptation. The most recent example of this is the Latin American Communist Parties which--under CPSU guidance--took about five years (early 1949-late 1953) to bring the strategy and tactics of the "National Liberation" program to the present stage of development. It is important to keep in mind this phenomenon of lag in the development of International Communist tactics: the "push button" view is to be avoided.

Although the pattern appears at first glance to be a new approach by the International Movement, it is, in fact, rooted in the late Stalin epoch (i.e., beginning in 1949, with significant shifts in 1950-1951 and later). Special attention to these "roots" will be given in future issues of the series, which will, also, attempt to refine and specify individual themes of the current international pattern.

It is also necessary to bear in mind that the present analysis considers only the design--the intentions--of the International Communist Movement, and does not attempt to balance this against its capabilities.

As a means of testing the validity of the general hypothesis presented here, and of eliciting specific instances of practical execution of the new World Communist tactic, a check list is appended. The check list is intended also as a briefing and debriefing guide and for sharpening the focus of coverage and reportage on the activities and plans of various elements of the International Communist Movement.

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I. THE SOVIET PATTERN FOR EXPANSION THROUGH "PEACEFUL, COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE"

1. The "new style" of Soviet foreign policy is but one of the arms of the expansionist drive of International Communism. The leading organ of the International Communist Movement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), is at the same time the directing agency of the new style diplomacy.

> "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is firmly and confidently leading the Soviet people along the path of building Communism. Guided by the all-conquering teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, it wisely and sagaciously directs the international foreign policy of the Soviet state and with outstanding skill organises the carrying out of the tasks set."
>
> (Cominform Journal, 22 July 1955, "Historic Decisions of the July Meeting of the C.C. of the CPSU." Underlining supplied.)*

> "The CPSU's foreign policy is based on Lenin's premise on the struggle for peace, peaceful coexistence and competition of socialist and capitalist systems.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The Party. . . . is ably combining the integrity of principle with flexibility in foreign policy."
>
> (Kommunist No. 14, September 1955. Underlining supplied).

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* The official organ of the Cominform, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!, is cited throughout this paper as Cominform Journal.

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2. The other arms of the CPSU within the Free World--the Communist Parties, national and international fronts, and clandestine assets--have been adjusting to the requirements of the new style diplomacy and other elements of the global tactic.

3. The "new diplomacy" and the tactics of the Communist Movement within the Free World are designed to complement each other.

4. "Peaceful Competition" is the slogan by which the Soviets have defined their new foreign policy. The expansionist connotation of the term "competition" is plain. The element of competition has only recently received increased emphasis--and, above all, been practically implemented--within the context of the slogan of "peaceful coexistence," under which the Soviets have sought to establish a climate of "negotiability"* as a means of breaking down the barriers erected against Communist expansion during the Cold War. The establishment of this climate is prerequisite to the launching of a full-scale, effective competition with the United States for the sympathies of neutral and potentially neutral forces within the Free World, with special reference to the "colonial and dependent" countries.

5. "Peaceful Competition" operates in a number of spheres:

--the diplomatic, where the Soviets compete with the United States for influence over uncommitted governments within the Free World and to break down the ties between the United States and its allies;

* By removing the obstacles to the settlement of the Austrian problem, by pushing for "normalization" of relations with Japan, West Germany, and Yugoslavia; by putting forward more reasonable appearing proposals for arms reduction; by turning back Porkkala to Finland; by agreeing to the "Summit" Conference; by adopting better manners in diplomacy and a more discriminating external propaganda.

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--the economic, where the USSR has intensified its drive for trade with Free World countries, both as a means of bringing them into greater dependence upon Communist economic resources and trade, and as a means of gaining access to Free World material resources needed to build up the strength of the Communist bloc;

--the "cultural", scientific, etc., in which the Soviets not only gain access to Free World technological assets, but are also able to contact and influence important political and social groupings within Free World countries. The "exchanges" being pushed by the USSR so strongly during the period under review, and the easing of travel restrictions, are intended to open up the Free World to further Soviet expansion.

6. Three basic action principles are observable in the new style diplomacy:

a) maintenance of a general climate of negotiability;

b) maintenance of the essential strategic positions of the Communist bloc (e.g., on Germany, disarmament);

c) exercise of pressures on specific areas of potential disaffection or conflict of interest within the Free World (e.g., Egyptian arms deal).

7. In its peace line, the CPSU has specified, and has continued to emphasize that the "relaxation of international tensions" does not mean that "vigilance" can be reduced.

> "....It is to be noted that in the Western countries all kinds of enemies of peace and protagonists of the 'cold war' are seeking to sow pessimism in regard to any further relaxation of international tension and to check the fresh wind blowing from Geneva.... All those who cherish peace and security must continue to be vigilant in relation to the intrigues of the enemies of peace."
>
> (Cominform Journal, 29 July 1955).

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8. It can thus be seen that there is no real "contradiction," from the Communist point of view, between the "Geneva Spirit" and the Egyptian Arms deal. They are two aspects of the new style foreign policy. The recent Soviet efforts to saddle the West with the blame for the failure of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' conference shows this, and indicates how the Soviets are skillfully capitalizing on the awkward positions which the tactic of alternating hot and cold tends to impose on the West. The main effect of the Soviet tactic is aimed at the countries of Asia and Africa. Presumably, the Soviets can repeatedly appeal for revival of the "Geneva Spirit" by additional bilateral and secondary concessions. Such actions will again raise hopes that will yet again be deflated in the conflict between the West and the Communist bloc over the basic issues, upon which the Soviets will continue to remain intransigent.

9. The global t actic which has been emerging throughout 1955 has these main objectives:

a. To roll back Western unity and strength; to diminish the power of the United States to rally Free World unity, by detaching uncommitted countries from the United States (focus on Asia and Middle East), and by manipulating and sharpening tensions between Free World countries.

b. To facilitate the build up of Communist Bloc power for what the Soviets consider will be an eventual and inevitable show-down with the United States.

c. To facilitate the expansion of Communist overt and covert assets within the Free World (i.e., the national and international Communist fronts, Communist Parties, Soviet/Satellite espionage assets and other Communist clandestine capabilities).

d. To refurbish Communism as an attractive goal: on a world scale, to give the Communist system a mass appeal that is competitive with the Free World system of "bourgeois democracy".

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10. The aggressive, expansionist purpose of the new Tactic of International Communism cannot be overemphasized. It is not defensive, in the sense of being a retreat because of serious Communist internal weakness, as some observers appear to believe. It is a program for dynamic advance of Communist political, economic and subversive power by new techniques; a program which substitutes tactical astuteness for rigid dogmatism; which makes tactical withdrawals for strategic advantages.

11. Whenever the Soviet leaders reassess the world balance of power and the potentialities of each side in the struggle for power, they adopt a new set of tactics which apply in their foreign and domestic policy and to the International Communist Movement outside the Orbit. Such a basic reassessment seems to have led to the change of leadership in the USSR and to the adoption of the new style foreign policy. Neither all the factors which entered into this reassessment, nor the relative weight which was given to each, are known. Certainly, the ratification of the Paris Agreements was a most important immediate factor. Others probably included considerations of the universal danger of nuclear warfare, the economic potentialities of the Communist bloc over a period of continued, and more intensive, build-up. It is possible that there was pressure within the Communist world for a revision of the methods by which coordination of the economies and of political controls is achieved. There have also been some signs of a revision of Communist estimates on the stability and potentialities of world capitalism.

12. For reasons which are not fully apparent at this time, the Soviet leaders approached their basic problems with a sense of realism which was in contrast to the dogmatic subjectivism of the Stalin period. Basically, it would seem that the Khrushchev leadership finally decided to overcome the rigidity of the "two camp" formula of the 1947 Cominform meeting, at least to the extent that the rigidity of that formula was nullifying the effectiveness of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. The main defect of the 1947 formula was that it had attributed to the non-Communist world a unity and anti-Communist hostility which it did not really have, at least until Communist military aggression and vituperation stimulated it.

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Despite indications late in the Stalin period and during the Malenkov period that the Soviets were working towards a new tactical formula, there was no real change in Soviet methods until the Khrushchev-Bulganin "team" took over. The new formula represents a systematic effort to exploit, in practical terms, and by all available means, the "contradictions" which Soviet propagandists had long been pointing to in the Free World, but upon which Soviet-Satellite-Chinese policy had not been effectively operating.

13. Soviet leaders have acknowledged that flexibility and realism constitute the basis of the new tactics:

a. "In the Central Committee our Party has a leading organ of a genuinely collective nature which is leading the Party and the country along the correct path and which combines firmness in internal and external affairs with great flexibility and courage in defining decisions of the most complicated tasks with Lenin-like wisdom."
(Moscow, TASS, 7 August 1955. Underlining supplied.)

b. "We are realists," Khrushchev said in connection with the 19 September Soviet-East German talks. "While solving the problem in question we must soberly evaluate existing conditions."
(Moscow, TASS, 19 September 1955)

c. "The Party solves... /its/ tasks, guided by the Marxist theory of revolutionary dialectics and by Lenin's admonition to avoid stereotypy and dogmatism, to be flexible in tactics, and always to take into account concrete conditions and study the true picture of living reality."
(Kommunist No. 14, September 1955. Underlining supplied.)

14. The new "flexibility" is reflected in the apparent promotion by the CPSU of the idea of the "independence and equality" of the Communist Parties--an idea put out in order to help the Soviets

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side-track Western attacks on International Communism. It is an approach which may eventually lead to new methods of coordinating the World Movement, and which may reflect Chinese Communist influence on the CPSU. At present, there is nothing to indicate that the CPSU has in fact weakened its hold over the other Communist Parties. But the recognition of other "roads to socialism" and the granting to Free World Communist Parties of more latitude in gearing their action to concrete local conditions, implies at least the possibility of the development of an increased measure of local autonomy.*

15 Underlying the new style diplomacy and all other elements of the current Soviet/Communist tactic remains the "international class struggle," which gives a solid ideological footing to the "realism and flexibility". This became quite apparent in the aftermath of the Belgrade visit, when the CPSU let it be known that the "normalization" of relations with Yugoslavia implied no surrender of its basic principles.** The "class war" has received

* Recent emphasis on the "non-intervention" claims of the CPSU during the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India are noteworthy. For example, in being introduced to an Indian Communist member of parliament, Khrushchev is reported to have said that he was not interested in the man's philosophy, but only in the fact that he was an Indian. (Washington Post, 4 December 1955). Again, the Central Committee of the CP India is reported to have issued a directive that Indian Communists should behave as Indians rather than as Communists during the visit, and for this reason, they should not display the hammer and sickle emblem. (Paris, AFP, 14 November 1955).

** This was done by doctrinal explanations issued by leading French and Italian Communists in rebuttal to the "hasty" and "superficial" criticisms made publicly by the head of the pro-Cominform CP of Trieste, Vittorio Vidali. This choice of non-Orbit Communist Parties as the medium for the corrective explanation is, perhaps, another instance of the CPSU's effort to minimize its controlling role.

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increased emphasis in Soviet and CPSU policy statements and propaganda since late 1954. A most recent example of stress upon the theme was published in the September 1955 (No. 14) issue of the theoretical journal, Kommunist, and in the October Revolutionary Anniversary speech by L. M. Kaganovich:

> "It is a most important task of Party propaganda to wage a merciless struggle for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory and against backsliding into alien ideological views. It is necessary constantly to expose.... /those who/ do not recognize the theory of class struggle and deny the direct opposition of principles between socialism and liberalism. With the growth of the forces of socialism the ideological struggle of Marxism against reformism is intensified."
>
> (Kommunist No. 14, September 1955).

> "....The October Revolution had and still has supreme international significance. It has exerted and continues to exert an increasingly decisive influence on the course of world events, on the historic destiny of mankind--and primarily of the working class.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "Imperialism itself is the stimulator of revolutions. As class contradiction becomes more acute within each country, so the working class and the working peasantry rally together. There appear the country's own leaders and organizers, who have not been imported from abroad, as represented by the slanderers. The striking force of the working class--the revolutionary party--is organized and tempered in battle. Revolutionary ideas know no frontiers; they travel throughout the world without visas and fingerprints."
>
> (Kaganovich--Moscow broadcast, 6 November 1955).

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16. The CPSU expects its other external arm--the International Communist Movement--to play a key role in this global "class struggle": on the one hand, it is to support the actions and the objectives of the new style diplomacy; on the other, to exploit the openings provided by the diplomacy. There is evidence that the CPSU is not yet satisfied with the International Movement's understanding of its new tasks or with its exploitation of the new opportunities.

There is also evidence that some Communist Parties have not begun to reap the gains which were expected from the new international tactics; that, on the contrary, the new line has resulted in losses for them (especially, by causing confusion among the rank and file).

17. The international "class struggle" remains the common bond tying the diplomacy of the Communist bloc and the tactics of the International Movement into a single, integrated program of action. The "class struggle" principle is the very keel of the new tactics, which are intended to be so flexible and so sensitively adjusted to reality that without such a stabilizer, the Communist Movement could easily go off course. It is essential that anti-Communists keep this firmly in mind. Otherwise, the subtleties--diversions, feints, infiltrations, flanking maneuvers, provocations, temptations, and smoke screens--of the new Communist flexibility will certainly obscure the motives and the methods of Communist action in specific situations.

18. In brief, firmly anchored in the international "class struggle" doctrine, the new style of Soviet/Communist tactics operates:

a) to sharpen the Communist attack upon the Free World strength by refining the definition of targets and by adjusting the attack(s) to "concrete" conditions;

b) to "depolarize" key sectors of the Free World in order to gain access to new assets which, at a later time, can be reconstituted around the Communist pole.

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(Note: The 20th CPSU Congress, to be held in February 1956 should shed additional light on the Communist program. The new international tactic will certainly be amplified and codified, as was the Popular Front program by the 7th Comintern Congress in 1935. It is likely that further details will be elaborated in the Soviet "transition to Communism"--a development which will be especially important in the Soviet campaign of competition, material and ideological, with the West. The October Revolution speech by Kaganovich contained several hints as to specific features of a program of "transition to Communism".)

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II. THE COMMUNIST PATTERN FOR EXPANSION WITHIN THE FREE WORLD: EXPLOITATION OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE

A. General Considerations.

1. During the period under review the CPSU has, as was noted above, strongly emphasized the basic Marxist-Leninist principle of the "class war."

2. The New Content of the Global Class Struggle. Formerly, the CPSU carried on the international class struggle by means of all-out, direct attack against the states of the "capitalist" world, with concentration on the United States. The propaganda of all agencies of the CPSU, including the agencies of the Communist governments and the international Communist Movement abroad, was centered upon this attack. Within the Free World, the attack was focused on the slogan of "national independence," i.e., independence from the United States, which, it was charged, had enslaved the rest of the Free World, including the other "imperialist" powers.

When the new Soviet leadership began to push the "peaceful coexistence" tactic in terms of concrete actions, it was made clear to the International Communist Movement that this tactic referred to "peaceful coexistence" between states, and not a reduction of the "class struggle," which is a bed-rock principle of Marxism-Leninism.

In other words, the Soviets are pursuing their new foreign policy strictly as a tactic within the framework of the irreducible "class struggle," and they are stressing this in their Party propaganda to prevent misunderstandings from arising within the International Communist Movement.

3. In addition to this effort by the CPSU to give the new Soviet diplomacy a firm ideological basis, the Communist Parties within the Free World are also reaffirming the "class struggle" principle. In doing so, they are reaffirming their obligation to assist the USSR in the execution of the new diplomatic tactics and their own goals of

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eventual seizure of power. But more significantly, their reemphasis of the "class struggle" means a more realistic targeting of their tactics and a more effective, more intensive search for usable allies.

4. In industrialized countries, the Communists are focusing their attack upon the capitalist system and against the employers as the "class enemy"; are concentrating primarily on extending their influence over non-Communist workers (especially Socialist and Catholic workers) by means of maximum exploitation of common immediate and concrete economic and social issues.

5. This does not mean that the Communist Parties of capitalist countries have given up trying to fragmentize and neutralize the capitalist class. On the contrary, this effort continues. But the new Soviet diplomacy broadens the opportunities for exploitation of the "contradictions" within the capitalist "class"--

a) by means of practical trade lures;

b) by the "relaxation of tension," which encourages a conflict of political and economic interests between various sectors of the capitalist "class";

c) by means of a more flexible tactic towards the "colonial and dependent" countries, which promotes the development of conflicting interests and sympathies within the capitalist "class" in the home country.

6. In other words, by shifting from the direct to indirect attack upon the United States, the new Soviet tactics seeks to encourage the emergence of frictions within the national capitalist "class", seeks to undermine the capitalist system as a whole, and gives the local Communists more effective levers to aggravate these frictions.

7. By concentrating primarily on local "class" issues (and other purely national issues), the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries seek not only to extend their mass influence, but also

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to aggravate the "contradictions" between sectors of the capitalist "class" and between this "class" and the working class.

8. To summarize, the stress on "class struggle" in capitalist countries involves not only the employment of specifically proletarian "class-against-class" tactics, but also, more flexible exploitation of frictions within the capitalist "class" and more practical utilization of allies--including, where possible, "vacillating" allies within the capitalist "class" itself. The basic struggle against the "class enemy" remains fixed, but the CPSU has given the Communist Parties in capitalist countries a better chance to gear their action to concrete local conditions--in a sense, to "nationalize" themselves. This element of the current international tactic has been specifically promulgated by Soviet leaders by their emphasising "non-interference in the internal affairs of other states" and the line that social revolutions are purely national matters--that the CPSU does not and can not, "export" revolution. That this is a bald-faced lie is irrelevant. In terms of tactics, the CPSU does appear to have begun a serious campaign to establish the "independence" of the external Communist Parties in the sense of encouraging them to act upon the objective realities of local conditions.

9. This concept is "Leninist" in origin, but it had been in eclipse for so long under the Stalin system that it is thought of today as a "Mao-ist" idea (a view which exists within the Communist cadre abroad).

10. In the "colonial and dependent countries" the "class struggle" proceeds as before on the Chinese-developed strategy of the "national liberation" movement. This strategy depends upon bringing to bear a "concentration of fire" upon a foreign "enemy". It seeks to exploit conflicts of interest between the "national bourgeoisie" (i.e., capitalists whose interest conflict with western policies and with foreign--non-Orbit--capital) and the "compradore" or "pro-imperialist" capitalists. The aim, where possible, is to enlist the "national bourgeoisie" in the local "national liberation" movement.

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11. Because of the above considerations within the "national liberation" strategy, the re-emphasis of the "class struggle" in these countries cannot mean as pointed a campaign against capitalism as it does in capitalist countries. As a leading Indian Communist has recently specified, the attack on capitalism in India must be indirect:

> "...The basic tasks outlined in the Party Programme remain /despite the shift which the CPSU had dictated for the CP India on the question of the foreign policy of the Nehru Government/. It is imperialism and feudalism that continue to block the country's progress....
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "The success of the struggle against the policies of the government therefore depends entirely on the extent to which the democratic elements in general, and the Communist Party in particular, make serious efforts to defend the interests of all those sections of the people who are affected by the anti-people policies of the government--including sections of the bourgeoisie--and in drawing sections of the ruling party itself into these struggles. This obviously has to be on the basis of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal and not an anti-capitalist programme."
>
> (E. M. S. Namboodiripad, New Age, September 1955. Underlining supplied.)

12. Nevertheless, in their own eyes, the new International Tactic opens up for the Communists of such countries as India new opportunities for fighting the local capitalists. According to the Indian Communists, the conflicts of interest within the ruling "class alliance" will prevent the effective expansion of the economy and will generate--

> "innumerable conflicts at every stage--conflicts with imperialism, with feudalism, with other sections of the bourgeoisie and, above all, with the mass of the Indian people."
>
> (--Ibid.)

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13. In India, the new Soviet diplomacy and the international line on "class struggle" have not only relieved the Communist Party of much of its former unproductive campaign against the United States (as a state) and permitted it to concentrate on the more visible foreign "enemy" (Great Britain), but have also given the Party more flexibility and precision in its definition of local enemies.

In positive terms, the new line permits the Indian Communist Party to postulate an alternative economic and social policy while relieving it of the necessity to appear the total oppositionist, the dog-in-the-manger, that it has been up to the present. This is illustrated by the Party's "positive" stand on obtaining increased economic and technical assistance from the USSR.

In local political issues--e.g., the Goa issue--the Party has been able to appear as more patriotic than the "bourgeois nationalist" Government itself.

14. In brief, the new style Soviet diplomacy has had a substantial effect on the tactics of Communist Parties in countries which the Soviets are seeking to pull into their own bloc.

15. Meanwhile, the "class struggle" line of the International Communist Movement frees the Communist Parties in "colonial and dependent" countries to pinpoint their attacks more effectively on the basis of objective local realities. In terms of local propaganda, where the Communist Party has shifted somewhat away from the attack upon the United States as a state (for example, in Latin America: see para. 36 below), it continues to attack concrete manifestations of U.S. "imperialism" on the local scene.

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16. Insofar as armed action constitutes the most important "form" of the "class struggle" in the "colonial and dependent" countries,* the international Communist line, during the period under review, has indicated considerable flexibility.

17. On the one hand, the CP Japan has publicly disavowed its former excesses of violence and has ostensibly disbanded its para-military organization.

18. On the other hand, there is evidence that the CPSU is encouraging the use of armed action in Latin America. This development was suggested by the enthusiastic reception which the CP Brazil gave to the publication in the Cominform Journal (28 January 1955) of the "Theses" of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute on the 1905 Russian Revolution. The "Theses" emphasized the importance of armed action by workers and peasants. CP Brazil, which, it is essential to note, is the "model" Party for Latin America, hailed the publication of the "Theses" as a "well-spring of experience for all peoples"--a reception which was duly recorded in the Cominform Journal of 29 April. The Party published a statement on its armed struggle policy in March. This policy was publicly reiterated in August.

* This does not mean that the Communist Party in the "colonial or dependent" country has no other "forms of struggle." Whether it goes into armed uprising or concentrates on other "forms of struggle" at any given time depends upon its own (and the CPSU's) estimate of the revolutionary possibilities. In other words, while armed struggle is the "supreme form" (in the words of the 1928 Program of the Comintern) of revolutionary action, its use depends upon a complex of circumstances, as assessed by the Communists.

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It is cleverly keyed to the question of a possible rightist military coup against the constitutional regime: the Brazilian Communists talk in tems of armed action to uphold the constitution. Indications are that the immediate aim of these declarations is not military, but "psychological": i.e., that they are issued in the hope of generating widespread fear for the safety of democratic liberties and the existing constitutional system. The Communists thus hope to facilitate the extension of their influence in the creation of the "single democratic front of national liberation." Another objective is to spread the belief that the local Communist Party is a firm and patriotic defender of the constitutional regime and should therefore be given full legal status and freedom of action. Mingled with this aim is the Party's fear that it would be more severely repressed if a right-wing regime came to power.

At the same time, it should be realized that such "patriotic" declarations by a Communist Party can serve as a convenient "legal" cover for the organization of paramilitary formations ostensibly created solely for purposes of initiating or participating in armed resistance to an attempted right-wing coup. According to the terms themselves of the CP Brazil's policy, this armed struggle would be directed toward achievement of at least partial, temporary military-political successes. These would represent lasting propaganda gains for the Party and would give it a strong advantage in the drive for the establishment of the alliances necessary for the "single, democratic front of national liberation", which would wage a revolutionary fight for the establishment of a "People's Democratic" regime.

19. To continue the evidences of foreign Communist encouragement of armed action in Latin America, it is to be noted that on 20 August, the Chinese Communist People's Daily praised the guerilla warfare being carried on in Colombia.

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20. The most recent, and by far the strongest expression of CPSU encouragement of armed action in Latin America, is to be found in an article by A. Sivolobov* in the Soviet publication International Affairs (No. 9), signed for the press on 13 September 1955. In the light of his past record, the author's praise for armed uprisings in the past and for the current Colombian guerilla activity is to be taken as an authoritative directive for the Communist Parties of Latin America.

21. The foregoing does not mean that the Latin American Communist Parties are being ordered to begin armed rebellions in the immediate future. The Sivolobov article should be taken as a specific reaffirmation of the 1949 Liu Shao-chi formula for successful "national liberation struggles" to the effect that the Communist Parties in the "colonial and dependent" countries should always consider the possibility of armed action, "wherever and whenever possible;"** and as a directive to the Latin American Communists to work in the direction of eventual armed action, to be initiated when local conditions, which they help to create, will make armed action feasible.

22. While the CP Japan is concentrating on "legal" forms of struggle, and the CPSU is directing the Latin American Communist Parties to work toward armed action (and other forms of militant action) wherever and whenever possible, there are Communist Parties that have been carrying on armed struggle for years:

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* Sivolobov's writings indicate that he is a CPSU expert on the strategy and tactics of Latin American Communist Parties. In the article cited, he emphasizes strike action, as well as armed action.

** The qualified character of Liu's endorsement of Communist armed rebellion must always be observed.

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Malaya, Burma, the Philippines. The Communists in these countries have been attempting to end their armed uprisings for the time being on conditions favorable to themselves, in order to exploit "legal forms of struggle" more effectively. Thus far, their conditions have not been met by the Governments, and the armed struggle line continues to hold, although there has been a marked decline in acts of violence.*

23. In Laos, meanwhile, sporadic fighting has continued during 1955 between the Communist-controlled Pathet-Lao (an instrument of the Communist Ho-Chi-minh Government) and the forces of the Royal Laotian Government, and the Communists continue to hold their military base in two northern provinces. While they hold these areas, they are able to frustrate a negotiated peace and the establishment of Royal Government sovereignty therein.

* The latest indication of a basic shift away from armed struggle consists of a Karachi broadcast of 2 December 1955 to the effect that the Burmese Communist Party made a conditional surrender offer coincident with the arrival of Bulganin and Khrushchev in Rangoon. The offer was conditioned by demands that Burma continue to resist being included in any Anglo-American (presumably, military) pact; that all political prisoners would be released; and that the Communists and other "democratic" groups would be given full constitutional liberties.

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24. Integration of the Foreign Policy of the USSR with the Tactics of the External Communist Movement. The close integration of the tactics of the Communist bloc with those of the International Movement is strikingly evident in the new Global Tactic. While Soviet diplomacy moves to fragment Free World unity, to outflank the United States by indirect attacks on its allies and "reserves," the International Movement tries to generate pressure upon Free World governments and important sectors of the Free World elite to accede to the Soviet foreign policy aims. Moreover, by redirecting their tactics within Free World countries, the Communist Parties and fronts undermine anti-Soviet governments and political groupings and exploit the new opportunities for expansion of political and organizational influence which the new Soviet tactics open up for them.

25. Mutual Benefits. The International Movement outside the Communist Orbit thereby gives active support to the Soviet foreign policy drive while building up its strength for eventual seizures of power.

Even that which is seen as the opening of a campaign by the CPSU to make Communism more attractive and more positively competitive with Western ideology (e.g., the "transition to Communism") has a parallel in the International Communist Movement, where a vigorous campaign is being launched against the ideological bases of capitalism, coupled with propaganda that the Communists do not in the least intend to impose their beliefs on non-Communists but seek only agreement on "concrete" local issues.

26. Uneven Adoption of the New Tactical Orientation. The shift in the tactics of the International Communist Movement has not (and historically, has seldom) taken place simultaneously, uniformly or fully. It is still confined largely to the areas of policy formulation, propaganda, and inner-Party publication, rather than the field of specific action. A change in tactical orientation usually requires a relatively long period of "selling" within the movement, and a period of readjustment. As the

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shift is increasingly assimilated and adapted to specific local conditions, it will become increasingly visible in terms of concrete action.

27. Furthermore, the new tactical orientation probably will not be applied in exactly the same terms everywhere. It will be recalled that "flexibility" and realistic adjustment to local conditions is also a part of the International program.

28. The Communist assessment of the realities of local conditions will directly affect how the "class struggle" is carried on. Reference has already been made to the broad distinction between industrial countries and "colonial and dependent" countries. It is further to be noted that where the Communists have been carrying on armed struggle for "national liberation" (Philippines, Malaya, Burma) they may continue to do so, within the requirements of the international Communist program. However, in Burma especially, to continue armed struggle would seem in theory at least to be potentially disadvantageous to the Soviet effort to harness the Burmese Government more closely to Communist policies.

29. The discussion which follows considers the evidence of the promulgation of what is viewed in this paper as a reorientation of Communist tactics on the basis of the international "class struggle" line as a general directive; and reviews what appear to be cases of practical implementation of this directive by individual Communist Parties and fronts.

B. CPSU Promulgation of "Class Struggle" Tactics

30. The principle of the irreducible "class war" is, of course, a constant in Communist propaganda. There is evidence, however, that it has been given increased emphasis during the past year, and that this emphasis constitutes a directive to the International Movement to reorient its tactics during the period of "relaxation

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of international tension," when the USSR has deliberately attempted to shift from its frontal attack against the United States.

31. In the USSR, the stress on "class struggle" was first observed within a broader re-emphasis of the whole body of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and of a "creative" (i.e., non-dogmatic, and, by implication, non-Stalinist) approach to Marxism-Leninism. This broad campaign, which, in retrospect, may be seen in its initial stages in mid-1954,* was clearly discernable in discussions of Soviet literature at the Second Writers' Congress in December 1954; in the discussion of the priority of heavy industry (December 1954 - March 1955); in the question of the consequences of nuclear war for the future of Communism as compared to that of capitalism (February - May 1955); and in CPSU statements directly bearing upon doctrine, strategy and tactics (especially in issues of Kommunist, January - May 1955).

* I.e., by the publication in Kommunist of an editorial reasserting the correctness of the 1946-48 "Zhdanovist" resolutions on "purity" in the cultural, scientific and ideological fields. An even earlier indication may be seen in Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" (1952), which undertook to bolster the claim of Marxism-Leninism to be a "science" concerned with discerning "objective" social-economic "laws." The new Soviet "Political Economy, a Textbook," published in 1954, continued this effort.

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32. The main elements of Marxist-Leninist doctrine stressed in these discussions were:

(1) The need to maintain "purity" of principles, and constant "vigilance" against contamination by "bourgeois ideology"; while--

(2) exercising "flexibility" in tactics, and while--

(3) correctly utilizing "everything really valuable in European and American science".*

(4) The dominant role of the CPSU within the USSR and, by extension, the dominant role of the Communist Party in the "class struggle" in every country;

(5) The irreducibility of the international "class struggle."

33. The CPSU injected this stimulus for a revival of basic Marxism-Leninism (with special reference to the "class war") into the policy of the International Communist Movement. This was observed in such instances as these:

(1) In December 1954 the WFTU launched an intensified (i.e., not a new) campaign against "capitalist super-exploitation"--a drive against raising worker productivity in capitalist countries, and a direct attack upon the very bases of the capitalist economic system;**

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* Party Life #8 (May 1955).

** The WFTU's campaign has been taken up by a number of Communist Parties, e.g., France (cf. para. 39, below); Belgium (cf. Drapeau Rouge, 15, 16, 22 June 1955. This represents a continuation by the CP Belgium of a campaign in 1954).

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(2) In January 1955 the Cominform Journal published the "Theses" of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute (MELSI) on the 1905 Russian Revolution, in which working-class leadership (in "alliance" with the peasantry)--in contrast to "bourgeois democratic" leadership was stressed and in which armed action was heavily endorsed as a means of carrying out revolution;

(3) On 22 April 1955, the Cominform Journal published an editorial commemorating Lenin's birthday in which unusually strong emphasis was given to the fight against capitalism;

(4) Other issues of the Cominform Journal have continued to reiterate the importance of the "class struggle"; of solid Marxist-Leninist education for Communists, of the "vanguard" role of the CP, and other elements in the overall campaign to reinforce the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

34. Of special interest is the Cominform Journal editorial of 14 October entitled "Struggle of Working People in Capitalist Countries for Their Vital Demands."

This editorial--significantly--does not mention the role of the United States in the other capitalist countries, the alleged "enslavement" of which was the key slogan of Communist propaganda during the Cold War. Instead of gearing their tactics to the issue of "American imperialism" the editorial tells the Communist Parties of all capitalist countries (including the U.S.) to build "working class unity" in struggle for such "concrete demands" as "higher wages, the cessation of mass dismissals, increased unemployment benefits, improved working conditions, abolition of the speed up, and the end of discriminatory rates of payment for women and young workers"

This editorial, a direct attack upon the capitalist system ("impoverishment of the working class"), stresses "unity in action," with special reference to strike action.

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35. The CPSU, meanwhile, has continued the emphasis upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine which was observable earlier in the year, e.g. --

(1) Issue No. 14 of Kommunist (signed for publication, 30 September)--the issue in which Molotov's letter of self-criticism appeared--contained an editorial which reasserted "the purity of revolutionary theory" in the strongest possible terms. This editorial, which is especially rich in doctrinal discussion, stresses the need for the creative and realistic application of Marxist-Leninist methods to the solution of complex problems; avoidance of "stereotypy and dogmatism" and the need for "flexibility" in tactics, while at the same time insisting upon maintenance of "the unshakable principles of Marxism-Leninism." It reaffirms Leninist doctrine on the "further rotting of capitalism," while warning that "it would be a mistake to think that the tendency to rot excludes the rapid growth of capitalism."* The implication here is that the Communists must give a strong push to hasten the collapse of capitalism, and also, perhaps, that the Soviets have revised somewhat their real estimate of the staying-power of capitalism.

The editorial specifies that the "struggle of the workers in capitalist countries and the prospects of this struggle can be explained correctly only by adopting the view stemming from life itself and analyzing concrete facts from the Marxist position."

* A Soviet economist, A. Kats, who was sharply attacked in March for holding that capitalism would collapse "automatically," is again attacked by this editorial in the same terms--a fact which suggests persistence of error within Soviet theoretical circles.

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(2) The October Revolution Anniversary speech by L. M. Kaganovich is, like the editorial in Kommunist, extraordinarily rich in doctrinal implications. Among many other things, Kaganovich emphasized the sharpening of "class contradictions" within capitalist countries. He denied that there is now, as there was after World War I, any prospect for the "relative stabilization" of capitalism. He said that revolutions arise from the "internal contradictions" of capitalism and cannot be exported by the USSR, and he predicted "the triumph of socialism and communism" within the 20th century.

36. There is strong evidence that the CPSU, in addition to emphasizing, as a matter of doctrine, the priority of "class struggle" in terms of "concrete" local conditions as the task of the Communist Parties, has specifically steered some Communist Parties away from concentration on broad international issues toward a more intensive exploitation of local (class) issues. There is evidence that the CPSU is dissatisfied with the slow response of some Communist Parties.

(1) The Cominform Journal, in publishing articles on Latin America has, since the Summit meeting, noticeably soft-pedalled the issue of alleged "US imperialism" in Latin America. What is more significant is the fact that, in publishing accounts of policy statements and other materials issued by Latin American Communist Parties, the Journal has, since Geneva, deleted strong attacks against the United States Government which appeared in the original CP texts. The propaganda of these CPs, as it appeared in the Journal, concentrated its "fire" on local "class" enemies and, where America was brought in at all, tended to concentrate on specific "class" manifestations of US "imperialism" (e.g., Standard Oil, "Wall Street Monopolists," United Fruit, etc.) rather than on the United States as a State.

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This editing by the Cominform Journal gains added significance from the fact that US interests are visible in Latin America. In other words, "US imperialism" remains the main foreign "enemy" of the Latin American Communists, who continue to base their tactics on the Chinese Communist-CPSU formulas for "National Liberation" even as the Cominform treatment implies a revision in their propaganda tactics.*

(2) This development cannot be viewed as something less than a directive by the Cominform, for a highly reliable source has reported that a top official of the Communist Party in one Latin American country had recently explicitly instructed leading Communists in a mass organization to discontinue using the broad term "imperialism" and instead, to use the /more specific "class"/ term, "monopoly." In addition, he said that certain "anti-Yankee" terms should be modified in a Party-drafted statement which was proposed for publication by the mass organization in the local press, where it would be read mainly by non-Communists. There was a clear indication in his instructions that he had received international authorization (i.e., CPSU - inspired authorization).

* The most recent confirmation of this thesis was given in an article in the 11 November 1955 issue of the Journal by Dionisio Encina, the General Secretary of CP Mexico. While Encina emphasizes specific "class" aspects of "U.S. imperialist" influence in "all Latin American countries," he specifies that "Yankee imperialists" are the "main enemy" of the "peoples of Latin America."

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(3) Leaders of a West European CP recently have told their Party to concentrate on local "class" issues, primarily to break down Socialist and other non-Communist worker resistance to the Communist drive for "working class unity in action." The circumstances of this instruction strongly indicate CPSU direction.

(4) In addition to these positive indications that the CPSU has been telling the Free World Communist Parties to concentrate on local (primarily upon "class struggle," anti-capitalist) issues, a number of Communist Parties have shifted in this direction. In these cases, to be discussed below, there is no direct evidence of CPSU "guidance"; but it is fair to assume that they represent specific CP reactions to a general Soviet line of reorientation.

C. Progress in the Shift of the International Communist Movement to Local "Class Struggle" Issues

37. The most pronounced reorientation of tactics by a Free World Communist Party in response to the CPSU line on localizing (or "nationalizing") the attack by shifting to "class struggle" issues has occurred in France. Evidence of a similar shift has appeared in some other "capitalist" countries (e.g., West Germany, Belgium, Holland, Canada, and Italy), although to a generally less marked degree. To some extent, Communist Parties in many "colonial and dependent" countries have also shifted to exploitation of specific local issues (and in some cases, to anti-capitalist issues as well), but such CPs are more circumscribed in this by the nature of their basic tactics, which prescribe getting the support of the local "national bourgeoisie" (i.e., native capitalists whose interests conflict with the interests of Western or western-orientated capitalists) and which therefore complicate the promulgation of specifically anti-capitalist aspects of the "class struggle" tactics.

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38. The fact that it was the CP France which first markedly shifted* towards "class struggle" in Western Europe may be explained by the fact that France has been the testing ground for Communist tactical shifts ever since 1934. In other words, the reorientation of the CP France, which began in January with the launching of a major campaign aimed against the capitalist system and which has been manifest in many forms ever since, is here viewed not as an isolated local adjustment to specific conditions in France but as a prototype development in a general reorientation of the International Communist Movement.

39. The Reorientation of CP France (PCF). Secretary General Maurice Thorez launched the PCF Campaign against French capitalism at a Central Committee meeting in January, when he attacked the "relative and absolute impoverishment" of the working class under capitalism.** This doctrinal principle has continued to be asserted on all possible occasions in the CP press.

In May, Francois Billoux*** reported to a Central Committee meeting that there was some confusion within the Party over the identity of the "main enemy." It is "capitalism, the employers,

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* The KPD in West Germany was even more noticeably pre-occupied with trade union and "united working class action" at its Congress 28-30 December 1954 than it had been since 1950, and has not been noticeably behind the CP France in its emphasis on "class struggle."

** Cahiers du Communisme, March 1955.

*** (Considered by most observers to be a "hard-liner" within the Party leadership.)

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the bourgeois state," he declared.* A "study conference" was held on the subject of "capitalist super-exploitation" in May. This conference was staged by Economie et Politique, whose editor, Eugene Dumoulin, said that it was incorrect to speak of "productivité à l'américaine," as formerly, and that the correct term should be "capitalist productivity."** This underlines the Communist shift in emphasis away from the United States as a state and toward the basic class enemy.

In June, the French Communist labor confederation, CGT, scrapped its "constructive" Economic Program, adopted in 1953. The reason given for action was that the program had tended to dilute the "class struggle"--to "disorient our comrades in the face of the attacks of the adversary."*** A more strongly anti-capitalist program was adopted in its place.

In autumn of this year the PCF has approached the question of French North Africa largely on the basis of local and "class" terms of reference.

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* L'Humanité, 12 May 1955. Underlining supplied.

** Economie et Politique, June 1955.

*** L'Humanite, 13 June 1955.

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It has been observed* that in publishing an important policy statement issued by Party Organization Secretary Marcel Servin on 31 August, the Party's mass circulation paper, L'Humanité, deleted almost all of his anti-American remarks. On the other hand, in the periodical France Nouvelle, whose audience is much smaller and consists almost entirely of Communist cadres, these anti-American statements were published. The discrepancy in treatment shows that--

a) the CP deliberately concentrates on local issues so far as the Party rank-and-file and the mass audience is concerned, calculating that the anti-American line had little mass appeal, especially during a period when the Communists were trying to amplify the illusion of "relaxation" generated by the Summit meeting;

b) the CP reaffirms to its cadres that the United States remains the main enemy of world Communism despite the shift in the methods and tactical directions of the Communist attack.

In its mass propaganda the CP continued during September to soft-pedal (not to abandon completely) the anti-American issue. This was especially noticeable at the L'Humanité festival at Vincennes on 4 September.

40. While noting the CP's unusual focus on principles of "class struggle," some observers have tended to interpret it in purely local terms (primarily as the Party's attempt to counteract the progressive economic and social program of Mendes-France).

* France Nouvelle, 3 September and L'Humanité, 31 August 1955.

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This view appears to be too narrow, and it is significant that Thorez has recently ascribed a much broader and more basic reason for the concentration. In a speech at the opening of the Central Party School, 10 October, he reviewed the basic nature of the CP as the "vanguard" in the "class struggle" and said this:

> "In its persistent efforts to disseminate the theory of scientific Socialism in the working-class movement, our Party, since the beginning of this year, has once more had to firmly draw the attention of its members and the whole proletariat to certain fundamental laws of capitalist economy. It especially recalled the law according to which the relative and absolute impoverishment of the working class is the inevitable result of capitalist accumulation, of the concentration of capital, of the formation of big trusts which seize all the wealth of the country." (Cominform Journal, 21 October 1955. Underlining supplied).

Continuing, Thorez cited strike action as a major expression of class struggle.

> "In engaging in vast strike actions against the employers, the working class is precisely at this very moment showing that it is conscious of the need to fight against the lowering of its standard of living, for less meagre wages and less inhuman conditions of work." (Ibid. Underlining supplied).

Then he defined the correct relationship between action based on economic demands and the need to raise this to a higher level of political consciousness--the need to overthrow the "bourgeoisie."

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"At one and the same time Marxists combat the view of those who see only the political struggle and deny the importance of the economic fight of the proletariat, and the opinion of those who over-estimate the role of economic struggle and disregard the significance of the political struggle, the struggle for the final objective of the working class, for Socialism.

"The economic fight of the proletariat is highly important, but it cannot abolish the laws of capitalism and free the workers from exploitation and privation. It is aimed at the effects of capitalism and not at the fundamental cause of the proletariat's poverty, that is the capitalist mode of production."

(Cominform Journal, 21 October 1955. Underlining supplied.)

In describing the "allies" the Party would need, Thorez paid particular attention to the "working peasants." (An intensified effort to get peasant support has been noted in the Party's press, and especially concerned a Central Committee meeting in October, at which Thorez said that the "theory of the pauperization of the working class" also applied to the agricultural workers.)

The Communist position on "the struggles of the colonial peoples against imperialism," Thorez said, with primary reference to French North Africa, was also gaining support among "broader social strata of the population," which also represent allies.

The French Communists seek strength on two levels: the "united front of the working class and also the unification of the democratic and national forces, of which proletarian unity of action is the cementing force."

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41. By refocusing its tactical concentration of effort, the CP France is trying to reduce anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism within the Socialist Party and non-Communist trade unions. United Front appeals for joint action on a "minimum program" were issued to the Socialists in the cantonal elections last spring and on numerous occasions since then.

Recently, the CP has further broadened its appeal for unity in the forthcoming elections to include "republicans" as well as Socialists. In a speech to the Central Committee, Thorez

> "recalled that there is every condition in many provinces... to unite Communists and Socialists, and that the Communist Party is ready to propose without hesitation a fighting alliance to all other republicans in order to obtain a majority in a number of constituencies."*

He said,

> "'Socialists and Communists have agreed to include in their electoral program the minimum program of the national committee of struggle, vigilance, and defense of the lay school, which will probably be approved by other parties too.'"

Despite "differences" which have existed between the Communists and their prospective allies, Thorez said that agreement could be reached on immediate objectives and reiterated the Party's

> "readiness to support any step forward, any measure favorable to the working class and the people, any initiative serving the cause of peace, freedom, and national independence."

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* Moscow, TASS, 4 November 1955.

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42. To summarize, the CP France has made a major tactical shift toward concentrated exploitation of local issues. Primarily, it seeks to exploit working class social and economic issues, not only to weaken French capitalism, but also to gain access to and increase its influence over non-Communist workers. The Party evidently hopes to repeat its performance of 1934-35 and achieve, through pressure from below and the openings furnished from above by the new Soviet foreign policy, a broad "popular front" built upon a "united front" of workers and peasants. Such a movement would seek to force the government to adopt a pro-Soviet foreign policy and would eventually be in a position to take over state power.

How the International Communist Movement Seeks to Exploit the Climate of International Detente

43. On the one hand, Communist Parties are generally specifying that the "relaxation of international tensions" does not signify a relaxation of the "class struggle" (in terms either of anti-capitalism or of "national liberation.") e.g. --

> Canada: "Peaceful coexistence does not take away from the right of peoples to change their governments by their majority, democratic action, but presupposes that right." The idea that "peaceful coexistence" must include the maintenance of the status quo is "imperialist propaganda."
>
> (Leslie Morris, National Affairs Monthly, February 1955).

> France: "The action of Communists in capitalist countries, for the defense and emancipation of the working class, the support which they give to the movement of liberation of colonial peoples, has no connection with the problems posed by peaceful coexistence, that is to say, with establishment of peaceful relations between states, whatever their regime."
>
> (Pierre Courtade, L'Humanité, 30 September 1955. Italics in original).

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Belgium: Jean Terfve in Communisme No. 2, 1955, expresses views practically identical with those above--"peaceful coexistence" does not mean maintenance of the "status quo" in the colonies or in the capitalist countries.

Cuba: "...The achievement of peace agreements cannot mean that the oppressed peoples, the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial world, would renounce the struggle for their independence and accept--on the sacrificial altars of co-existence between the socialist world and the capitalist world--the yoke of oppression. Neither is it possible to expect that the working class of Italy or France, for example, postpone or set aside their legitimate yearnings to establish socialism in their respective countries.

It is one thing for the great states with antagonistic regimes to co-exist; and it is another, very distinct thing that the peoples would silence their protests and stop seeking their emancipation.

...Now when a period has begun in which Washington, London, and Paris are disposed to co-exist with Moscow without threats or atomic fears, we Communists shall continue with our struggle. We shall demand better wages and living conditions for the working class, land for the peasant, industries for the nation. We shall persist in raising the glorious banner of socialism. The gentlemen who yesterday, before all that, were wont to speak of 'agents of Moscow,' will walk with their tail between their legs. And those who take the position that we should give up the workingman's wages and national sovereignty as a 'token of guarantee' of co-existence shall have to shut up in the long run, because it is no longer possible to go on confusing things which are not identical."

(--RESPUESTAS del Partido Socialista Popular, published by the Press Dept. of the National Committee of the P. S. P. (CP Cuba). Havana, 22 August 1955.)

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Italy: General Secretary Togliatti scorns those "who seriously think it possible to assert that consolidation of the detente means that the Communist and Socialist movement has to retreat, that it has to allow itself to be swept aside, and that it has even to abandon some of its positions," as well as "those who declare that there will no longer be any necessity to talk of revolutions, that there should no longer be any revolutionary movements--and all this will be the result, presumably, of the relaxation of international tension." The CP Italy, he says, continues to "stand for the profound socialist transformation of our society" and to rely "on the strength and unity of the working masses."

(Cominform Journal, 7 October 1955).

44. At the same time, a number of Communist Parties* have specifically stated that they expect the climate of international detente to lead to local detente--i.e., they hope that removal of fear of the Soviet aggressive threat will reduce local anti-Communism; will give them increased freedom of action by leading to a relaxation of governmental pressures upon the Party; and will open up new roads of access to non-Communists.

* Including the CP Netherlands (cf. De Waarheid, 3, 20 August 1955.) Even prior to the "Summit" Conference, according to a report from a usually reliable source, the General Secretary of the CP Mexico was telling his party that a relaxation of tension would mean an end to severe anti-Communism and would give the CPs general freedom of action.

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For example, an article in the Italian Communist newspaper l'Unita, of 18 August, said that certain "cold war advocates" are--

> "now trying to draw a distinction between the internal and international situation. To them an international move to ease tensions is acceptable, but what is not acceptable is the thought of considering new relations at home with the Communists and their allies."

Aside from weakening anti-Communist measures of the Government, the primary problem of the CP Italy is how to break down Christian Democratic opposition to Communism, and in this connection, Deputy Chairman Luigi Longo made a statement in Unita on 18 August which showed how the Communists wished to translate the international detente into a local detente with Catholic workers:

> "When we refer to a possible dialogue with the Catholics, we don't ask anyone to renounce their belief in the world beyond--if they have any--or their preference for this or that philosophic, political or social system; we only ask those who say that they condemn the present social injustices and misery, to cooperate with us, to unite their efforts to ours, in order that all difficulties be overcome."

In other words, the Italian Communists seek a broad tactical alliance on the basis of working class interests, without regard to the basic ideological conflict between Marxist materialism and Christian idealism.

> "With our demand for an opening to the Left, /Longo continued/ we don't ask for the installation of a political monopoly. We only ask for the opening of a wider political

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and social cooperation among all popular forces. In present conditions, the opening to the Left does not necessarily mean opening towards the /Nenni/ Socialists or the Communists, or towards both, in the sense of their cooperation with the Government. It means much less. It simply means a policy that will bring an end to all government and management discriminations, a policy which will support the social relations among the people of the world..."*

* The "Opening to the Left" is a slogan invented by Nenni in an effort to break down Christian Democratic opposition to Socialism. It has appealed to a number of Christian Democratic leaders who believe that the "Opening to the Left"--or "Operation Nenni"--would not only enable them to form a stable coalition government but would also lead to a rupture between Nenni and the PCI. The picture is further complicated by a division of opinion within Nenni's own party over the question of participation with the Christian Democrats versus the alliance with the Communists. Rumors have persisted in Italy that Nenni would eventually break with the PCI--rumors which have met with consistent denials by Nenni. Most recently, he has said that "unity between the PCI and PSI is the permanent precondition for the conquest of democracy," and has reaffirmed that his party is "first of all faithful to the doctrine of revolutionary Marxism, to the practice of the class struggle, and to principles of proletarian internationalism."

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45. Reorientation of the International Communist Fronts. The major International Communist Fronts are also attempting to use the opportunities afforded by the "relaxation of tensions" to expand their influence and to break down anti-Communism on the part of organizations and individuals within their particular fields of action. These efforts are notable for their realistic adjustment to specific local conditions, their appeal to the interests of special groups, and their clever exploitation of the "Geneva Spirit" to promote an impression of reasonableness and tolerance.

To a remarkable degree, the tactics of the international fronts are similar to those of the new Soviet diplomacy: multi-pronged approaches and flanking maneuvers to fragmentize the "opposition," to undercut their positions, and to "depolarize" and detach sectors of the opposition from the influence of anti-Communism.

(a) Youth and Women's Fronts. The International Union of Students (IUS), World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), have launched energetic expansion programs. Self-criticisms for failings of a sectarian nature have been more pointed than ever before within the IUS and WFDY, and both have intensified their efforts to improve their appeal to non-Communists by exploiting specific vocational, avocational, and regional issues. More and more specialized meetings and conferences are being held or are being planned; more specialized propaganda materials are being published; an ambitious program for training leaders in special fields has been decided upon by the WFDY. The IUS and WFDY have been trying to regain their former Yugoslav affiliates.* The WFDY has

* The Communist International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) has most recently adopted this same policy. (Sofia broadcast, 19 October 1955).

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resolved to try to win back former affiliates in Scandinavia, and is planning to adopt the IUS tactics of broadening its appeal to non-Communist organizations by admitting a new category of "associate membership." The WFDY has said that the international detente should lead to an end of the "Cold War" with the non-Communist youth organizations* and that a joint meeting be held of the different international youth organizations. Organizationally, the WFDY has decided to enlarge its headquarters staff in order to facilitate the expanded activities. The IUS Council meeting in August voted to reestablish its Colonial Bureau to facilitate expansion into colonial areas. A further IUS measure to broaden its influence--the decision in 1954 to include high school student organizations--paid off in the Singapore student riots of May 1955.

(b) The Communist "Peace" Movement. The World Peace Council continues to promote Soviet foreign policy positions and to try to extend its influence to elements which had been repelled by the "old style" Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. The Peace Movement has played up the fact that its last (Helsinki) Congress was much more "broadly representative", i.e., attracted many more non-Communists, than were earlier Congresses. The Helsinki proceedings were marked by avoidance of clearly identifiable anti-American virulence, by a definite effort to put forward the peace movement as a "positive" rather than a merely negative force, and by an attempt to create the impression of broad ideological tolerance.

It is of interest to note that the local "Peace" organization in one European country has recently been reorganized as part of the effort to blur the pro-Communist character of the movement, and to "broaden" its appeal as a genuinely "patriotic" and positively "peace-loving" organization.

* Budapest broadcast, 9 November 1955.

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(c) The World Federation of Trade Unions has been making a more serious effort than formerly to establish contact with the anti-Communist confederations, ICFTU and IFCTU. Like the WFDY, IUS, and IOJ, the WFTU has rescinded its former position on Yugoslavia. It has a leading role, along with the national CPs, in fomenting social and economic disturbances, and in promoting "working class unity" through the exploitation of "concrete" local "class" demands.

Most recently, WFTU Chairman Di Vittorio published an article in the Cominform Journal, arguing that the international detente had created new possibilities for detente between the WFTU and its anti-Communist counterparts.* He hinted that the WFTU would even more definitely reorient its tactics to achieve "working class" issues. In the action of the French CGT in scrapping its "constructive" Economic Program of 1953 (an action which seems to have had direct Soviet approval), there is further evidence of such a "class struggle" reorientation. And in the editorial of Kommunist No. 14, there is a still further suggestion of this:

> "With the growth of the forces of socialism the ideological struggle of Marxism against reformism is intensified...It is a question of ideological influence on those representatives of the labor movement who, being subjectively faithful to the cause of socialism are trying to conciliate Marxism with reformism, since for reason of insufficient Marxist training, they show hesitation of ideas." (Underlining supplied.)

* The Executive Bureau of the WFTU later issued a declaration in the same sense (Pravda, 16 October 1955).

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This apparently is a barb aimed at Communist labor leaders who have "economist" or "reformist" tendencies, rather than at the "right-wing socialist" labor leaders.

(d) Salvaging. Possibly as a result of the rapprochement with Tito, a wartime front organization, the All-Slav Congress, appears to have been reactivated. This development would parallel the campaign for the repatriation of Soviet and Satellite emigrees, which, in turn, parallels a trend noted among Communist Parties towards the rehabilitation of expellees and defectors. The efforts of the IUS and WFDY to regain former affiliates is also in line with this development.

It would appear that the International Movement is dredging up whatever new or discarded assets it can in order to expand.

D. Communist "Competition" for Uncommitted Countries of Asia

46. A key element in the new style Soviet diplomacy is the effort being made to detach Asian countries from the influence of the United States. This drive operates at several levels, with the main effort being directed toward India and Burma.

The CPSU had been taking a progressively more favorable view of India and Burma for some time, a fact which became increasingly evident during late 1954 (after the publication of the Chou-Nehru Declaration of the "Five Principles" in June). In his foreign policy speech of 9 February 1955, Molotov set the stage for an intensification of the effort to pull India and Burma still further away from the West by declaring that, despite the fact that these countries were basically capitalist, they were pursuing a "peace" policy abroad--i.e., a policy favorable to the Communist Bloc.

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The Soviets have continued this tactic by such means as the plan to erect a Soviet steel mill in India, the red-carpet receptions given to Nehru and U Nu on their visits to the USSR, and now, by the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma, and Afghanistan.

47. As has been repeatedly stressed throughout this study, the new style Soviet foreign policy in its entirety is well within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist international "class struggle." The Soviet cultivation of India and Burma, as part of this global warfare, is to be viewed as a tactical maneuver to weaken the "capitalist camp" by detaching important segments. As a French Communist has recently pointed out* in rationalizing the Communist position on North Africa, Stalin had characterized such "struggles" as that of the Emir of Afghanistan and that of the "merchants and bourgeois intellectuals" of Egypt for independence as "'objectively revolutionary'" because such a struggle'" weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism'".**

48. The Communist position on such questions, according to Stalin, is that they must be viewed" 'not...in isolation, but on... a world scale.'"*** This is a theme which has received notable attention in recent Soviet statement (e.g., especially in the form of the slogan of "proletarian internationalism").

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* Cahiers du Communisme, September 1955.

** Citing Stalin, The National Question.

*** Stalin citing Lenin, Collected Works, XIX, 287.

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49. Reorientation of CP India. The Communist Party of India was obliged to make a special adjustment to the newly intensified Soviet cultivation of Nehru for his foreign policy, which the Soviets have evidently concluded is "objectively revolutionary."

The CPI observed the Soviet shift in January and February 1955, and subjected its line on the Nehru Government to close scrutiny. The discussion, which appears to have been somewhat unsettling, concluded with a new formulation of Party policy in June.

Briefly, the CP decided (a) to give general support to Nehru's "neutralist" foreign policy, while (b) maintaining pressure to keep that policy oriented in favor of the Communist Bloc; (c) to support such domestic policy proposals of the Government as increased India's independence of Great Britain and the United States. The Party made it clear that it would continue to work for the eventual overthrow of Indian capitalism and for the establishment of a "People's Democracy." It saw, in the Soviet diplomacy, not only a means of directly advancing the cause of world Communism, but also, a lever which, if properly used by the CP itself, could result in the fragmentation and destruction of the ruling bourgeoisie of India.

It is also interesting to note that the CPI, thanks to the abatement of direct Soviet attack upon the United States, found it possible in the June resolution practically to ignore the issue of "U.S. imperialism"--an issue which had little appeal in India in any case and which had irritated a substantial faction within the Party which prefers to concentrate the attack upon the remaining elements of British influence.

The CPI has a delicate problem facing it: how to select the issues on which it will support the Government, and exactly how far to go in specific detail; and, while exploiting local tensions, how to balance this action against the Soviet desire to maintain

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and strengthen Nehru's "independence." In practice, this is no easy task, and there is evidence that it has not been solved completely in such matters as the Kanpur strikes, the Goa issue, and the states reorganization controversy.

The CP India has seriously embarassed the Government in the Goa issue. It gained by being more "nationalist" than the nationalists, but its action also, should have somewhat opened Nehru's eyes to the true character of Communist "collaboration" with governmental policy.

50. Communist Tactics for Japan. In line with its effort to demonstrate Soviet reasonableness and in what was probably intended as a first step in the direction of detaching Japan from U.S. influence, Molotov initiated informal negotiations for the "normalization" of relations with Japan in December 1954-January 1955. That the Soviets were aware of the need for substantial preparation before such a result could be seriously contemplated, has been evident from the slow pace of the negotiations and the Soviet refusal to make any important concessions. From their point of view, it has been sufficient to hold up the bait before the Japanese in order to promote internal frictions within Japan--frictions which the Japanese Communist Party will foster and exploit, and which the Communists hope will eventually lead to the installation of a pro-Soviet regime.

51. The CP Japan (JCP) appears to have been alerted to the Soviet intentions before they were formally put into motion.* In any case, a JCP New Year's Statement** indicated that a considerable tactical shift had been decided upon prior to the delivery of Molotov's note to the Japanese Government (25 January).

* According to some Japanese press sources, the JCP began its readjustment to the new Soviet tactics following the publication of the Soviet-Chinese Declaration of October 1954 (i.e., the declaration issued with the visit of the Khrushchev delegation to Peking).

** Akahata, 1 January 1955.

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The new tactical line of the JCP emerged in the form of specific actions. Examples are the progressive emergence of Party leaders from underground existence, "unity" tactics in the February elections, measures designed to create the impression that the Party has disbanded its paramilitary organization, and policy statements (e.g., an analysis of Communist tactics in the elections and decisions of the 6th National Council meeting). This tactical line,

(a) bases itself squarely on the "class struggle", with the necessary adjustment to the "dependent" condition of Japan;

(b) recognizes that its past policies have been "sectarian" and "adventurist" as a result of over-estimating its own strength and under-estimating the strength of the "enemy";

(c) sets for the Party the tasks of making itself popular once more and of building its mass and internal strength from the ground up.

The JCP will seek to exploit every possibility for promoting frictions within the "bourgeois" "class enemy" and for enlisting popular support. It seeks to re-establish itself as a "lovable" Party, as Nosaka Sanzo was trying to do before the CPSU stopped him in 1950.

In policy terms, the Party hopes to generate sufficient pressure from below for the replacement of pro-Western governments by "neutralists" and progressively, pro-Communist regimes, and eventually, to establish a "People's Democratic" regime.

To do so, it works to create a broad "Democratic United Front for National Liberation" based on a united working-class front and the worker-peasant alliance. The latter will be built

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by maximum exploitation of basic local economic and social issues and of the issue of "national independence" from the United States (the issue upon which the Party hopes to destroy the unity of the capitalists and to gain the support of the "national bourgeoisie").*

E. Competition by Exploiting Conflicts in the Middle East.

52. In the Middle East, the main effort of the Communist Parties is directed toward promoting and exploiting conflicts of interest among the "imperialist" countries, as well as regional frictions, such as the Arab-Israeli, Greek-Turkish. For example, CPs in both the Arab countries and in Israel blame the U.S. for the tense Arab-Jewish situation. The Lebanese CP charges that the "clique of big landlords and capitalists" serving "the imperialists" has sold out Lebanese resources to "American Zionist companies" and also seeks to exploit fear of Turkish aggression under the Turko-Iraqi Pact.** The Israeli CP has recently*** decided to "intensify the struggle against the policy of the Israeli Government which is striving to conclude an anti-Soviet military agreement with the United States, and to follow a policy of peace and national independence." The "Anglo-American Monopoly" is blamed for

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* Details of the new tactical line of the JCP, and of its attempt to put this line into action cannot be included in the current paper. A subsequent report in the series will describe them more fully.

** Lebanese CP statement dated June 1955. Underlining supplied.

*** District conferences of the ICP as reported in Warsaw broadcast, 15 October 1955.

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Arab-Israeli tension, and Egypt's purchase of Czech arms is pictured as simply a reaction against "the pressure of those who want to force her to join the Turkish-Iraqi bloc." There is reason to believe, however, that the arms deal provoked some rank and file resentment within the Israeli CP.

In Egypt, meanwhile, with the advent of closer Egyptian-Orbit relations, the main local Communist organization (Unified Communist Party) was reported to have adopted recently a new line of attacking individual leaders, but not the Government as a whole.

The CP Greece has seen in the complicated tension over Cyprus a development which "has removed the clouds from many minds"* and which works to the Communist benefit in promoting sentiment for a broad movement for the overthrow of the present Government and the removal of American influence. Such a movement should be promoted "from below" and also, "from above," by the creation of "committees of unity and struggle" locally and of "a common committee of all the parties and popular groups." The CP sees an opportunity to rally a substantial movement on the limited issue of a new foreign policy, and even for the detachment of "ranks of the /Marshal Papagos/ Rally who recently have been orienting themselves toward patriotic views on questions of foreign policy." The Cyprus imbroglio, the CP says, has demonstrated "the rottenness" of Greek-Turkish friendship.

* Zachariades article on "Free Greece" Radio, 21 September 1955.

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F. Implementation: The New Tactic in Practice

53. It is not possible, within the scope of the present, general analysis, to attempt to describe in detail the various methods by which the International Communist Movement can implement the new policies in practical terms. Also, as has been explained, not only has the Movement not yet fully assimilated the new line, but it has not had enough time to develop local programs implementing it. It is possible here only to indicate some of the methods of implementation which have been observed in recent months, leaving for future reports in this series the task of covering the subject more fully.

First of all, it is to be noted that, simply by shifting its propaganda away from the broad issue of anti-Americanism and toward a fuller exploitation of local issues, the Communist Party can be regarded as implementing, in a practical way, the new style of Communist tactics.

A number of examples of this, and of further practical action by the Communist movement,have already been mentioned above, viz:

(a) The attempt of the CP France to establish unity in action with Socialists on such specific local issues as trade union action, lay education, anti-colonialism in the North African countries, and in local election agreements.

(b) The attempt of the CP Italy to break down Christian Democratic and right-wing socialist opposition by minimizing ideological disagreement and appealing to non-Communists on the basis of "concrete" local and "class" interests.

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(c) The decision by CP Japan to begin to build mass strength from the ground up and to re-establish itself as a Japanese organization; JCP participation in the February elections, with efforts to make local deals with non-Communists.

(d) A sharpening of the tactical exploitation of "concrete" local issues by CP India.

(e) The practical efforts of the international Communist fronts to broaden their appeal to non-Communist: appeals for joint action on limited issues, provisions for winning back former affiliates and for gaining new adherents on the basis of limited acceptance of Communist policy positions; organizational measures taken for expanding the work of the international fronts; concentration on "working class demands" by the WFTU.

(f) The plan of the CP Greece to create "unity committees" for broad action on the basis of opposition to the Government's foreign policy.

To these may be added other practical measures for carrying out the new Communist tactics: (a) unity of action techniques; (b) organizational measures; (c) clandestine action.

54. Unity in Action Techniques. Examples of practical measures adopted by the Communist Movement in recent months to broaden the scope of Communist influence and to break down anti-Communist resistance include the following:

(a) The Leipzig "Conference of European Workers Against German Rearmament." This conference was held under covert WFTU sponsorship in April. It addressed

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an "Open Letter" to the anti-Communist ICFTU and IFCTU, as well as to the WFTU itself (!) calling for a joint meeting to "consider jointly how to ward off the misery and the disaster which threatens the working masses." At its May meeting, the Executive Committee of the WFTU duly adopted the decisions of the Conference as "its own," and stated that the WFTU would "do everything in its power" to promote the calling of a joint conference of the three international labor organizations.

(b) "Revolving strikes" in France. The PCF and its trade union confederation, the CGT, have been fomenting a series of short (24 hour or less) strikes in single plants. Such "revolving strikes" are aimed at increasing militant activity on the part of all workers without the disadvantages and reprisals inherent in bigger strikes. Such a method enables the Communists to test and to stimulate worker unrest without excessive commitment, thus conforming to the principle spelled out in 1952 and reaffirmed this year that Communist trade union action must take into account uneven levels of militancy from place to place and at different times.

(c) On 23 July, the KPOe's political front party, "People's Opposition" decided to release its affiliates in order to broaden the scope of Communist-inspired "unity." The title "opposition" was deemed too negative and out-of-date, now that the party's stand on neutrality is presumably shared by everybody. A liaison committee was set up by the organizations which constituted the Peoples' Opposition in order to broaden the scope of its appeal.

For similar reasons, the KPOe front, Democratic Union, announced on 8 July that it was changing from a society into a political party pledged to "ensure for our fatherland all the benefits of a clearly defined neutrality."

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(d) Direct, positive appeal to individual non-Communists. The CP Costa Rica (PVP) has sent a letter of transmittal accompanying copies of its pamphlet "Let us Fight for this Plan against the Crisis" to individual non-Communist Costa Rican leaders. The substance of the letter reads as follows:

"We take the liberty of sending to the entity which you represent the pamphlet "LET US FIGHT FOR THIS PLAN AGAINST THE CRISIS", in which we analyze the economic situation through which the capitalist world is passing, and we propose measures which would be capable of opposing the crisis which has already begun to affect our country.

"We are sure that the reading of this pamphlet will reveal that there exist many coinciding points of view among the different classes existing in the country, determined to save our Country from the evils which threaten her and which make practicable our opinion that the formation of a NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT is urgent and possible.

"We should feel very pleased to receive the points of view of that entity concerning this, as well as suggestions relative to directing the common efforts toward the achievement of the unity of the national forces."

55. Party Building. Communist Parties are always concerned with strengthening themselves internally, and this has been a major preoccupation for several years. Since the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952, the main theme in the Communist internal organizational effort has been that of activating the entire membership. After Stalin died, the principle of "collective leadership" at all levels of the Party became the principal device

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for accomplishing this result. Instead of a chain of individual bosses, the Communist Parties everywhere began stressing the active participation of all responsible functionaries in planning, discussing, and executing Party work. At the cell level, this principle was intended to get all the cell members into active work for the Party--to generate enthusiasm, to make the rank-and-file commit themselves to the effective carrying out of tasks, and to make them contribute to the Party's knowledge of the realities of local conditions by opening up candid discussions of concrete problems. Other devices connected with "collective leadership" and with the general drive to activate the Party (such as, stimulation of criticism from below; changes in Party structure; new ideas in the communication of instructions from the center; etc.) have been observed throughout the International Movement. While too complex to be discussed in the present paper, these devices have continued to be advocated during the current period.

56. It is still too early to discern in detail new developments in Communist Party organizational practices, that can be directly linked with the emergence of a new International tactic.

57. However, a preliminary examination of current CP organizational practices reveals a number of developments which may suggest a general trend:

(a) Recognition of basic weaknesses. A number of Communist Parties (Colombia, Japan, Pakistan) have sharpened their focus on the realities of their internal struggle. They have ceased trying to rationalize internal weaknesses; have subjected their respective conditions to sharply critical analyses; and have concluded that they need to rebuild themselves "from the bottom up" as CP Japan has put it.

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(b) Salvaging. Some Communist Parties (notably CP Japan, but also CP Iraq) have decided to rehabilitate disaffected and purged former members. (CP Japan has recently claimed that over 2,000 such members have been salvaged.)

(c) Reassignment of "weak" members. The CP USA has indicated that some of its inactive members should be reassigned to "mass work." In other words, it estimates that many Communists lack the courage to carry out assignments for the CP openly, but that they can be used profitably and in accordance with their own desires in penetration of non-Communist organizations.

(d) Revision of Party Statutes. The CPs outside the Orbit have been gradually revising their statutes to make them correspond to changes made in the statutes of the CPSU in 1952. The main purpose of such revisions is to write the activation drive into statutory terms (mainly by expanding and redefining the duties of Party members; but also by emphasizing "collective leadership" and changes in meeting procedures, disciplinary measures, etc.)

(e) Structural changes to stimulate activation of the entire Party and to improve supervision. For example, the CP Finland has reduced the size of its city committee in Helsinki and has established a general body (apparently, a kind of "aktiv") of all the heads of base organizations within the city. Moreover, in line with the long-observed effort of Communist Parties in capitalist countries to strengthen their factory cells, the Trade Union Section of the District will now supervise all factory organizations within the District directly. As of last report, these practices are being extended to all other cities in Finland.

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(f) Tightening up "mass CPs". One CP--the Indonesian--which had greatly expanded its membership by a massive recruitment drive, in which the emphasis was placed upon development after recruitment, has been making efforts to tighten up internally. In February, Secretary General Aidit called for intensified efforts to turn the rather amorphous Communist movement into a real CP. Training and close supervision are key elements in this drive.*

(g) Membership expansion: putting the CP forward. In capitalist countries where the CP is very small, it is indicated that intensified--but selective--recruitment and holding drives are under way. For example, the Executive of the British CP in March "boldly and frankly placed the issue of fluctuation in membership as a key problem that must be solved..."** The Party decided that, in addition to "a big sustained recruitment drive," practical steps would have to be taken to keep hold of existing members, chiefly by closer control and supervision. Too many Communists, it was said, think strictly in terms of working inside the Labor Party and the trade unions. This represents a "danger of submergence of our Party in the general labour movement" and must be overcome. Party members must "work in Party organizations" rather than devote their whole time to 'mass' work. The Party must make itself

* Kehidupan Partai, February 1955.

** National Organiser John Gollan, in Cominform Journal, 24 June 1955.

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"visible" in order to raise the level of "broad united work" from limited immediate issues to generate convictions that only a "socialist" revolution can solve the basic problems of the country. The CPUSA has adopted similar views.*

(h) Purges and Discipline. Whenever the international line changes, CPs everywhere face problems of keeping discipline over Party members who, for one reason or another, disagree with the new tactic. Occasionally, disagreement is so basic that important functionaries must be purged. The present shift in tactics contains a potential for significant tensions to develop within a number of CPs, primarily in terms of dissatisfaction among extreme left-wingers and militants who take their doctrine seriously and who may have trouble accepting the CPSU synthesis of a "soft" foreign policy and a "class struggle" ideology. It is too early to tell how strong such tensions may become, and it is entirely possible that the synthesis may be generally acceptable (especially if the CPs push a salvaging drive). Among the major CPs, tensions already exist in India, and may become more critical as the CP tries to implement its current line in practical terms. There have been few important purges during the current year, but the CP Uruguay ousted its Secretary General Eugenio Gomez Chiribao in July on a variety of charges. The most pertinent of these were that he was dictatorial, that he resisted CPSU direction, and that he sabotaged the Party's effort to apply Mao-ist broad "united front" tactics. It is by no means clear that his ouster had any direct connection with the adoption of a new international tactic.

* Party Voice No. 7--1955.

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(i) Organizational changes in the International Fronts. A few of the organizational measures adopted by the major international Communist fronts to extend their influence have already been mentioned (para. 45)--e.g., the use of "associate membership" in the WFDY and IUS as a means of gaining initial access to non-Communist groups, as well as the expansion of the WFDY headquarters staff. To these it is worth adding a measure taken by the WFTU which may be interpreted as part of an effort to base its work more solidly on local conditions. The WFTU has reduced its central training program and has indicated that it will concentrate on regional or national programs.* Such a change, while it may have been dictated by other factors, would certainly be in line with the over-all drive of the Communist Movement to localize and specialize its activities.

58. Secret Apparats. It appears that the Soviet Intelligence services are taking advantage of the opportunities which the current climate affords for more aggressive recruitment operations, and that they are making increased use of Communist Parties for support (e.g., spotting agents among front groups).

59. A number of CPs which are subject to varying degrees of repression have also indicated that they are making an effort to strengthen the clandestine cadre network which directs and coordinates the "legal" activities of the Party. The Parties in Greece, Pakistan, and Iran have called for an expansion and strengthening of their underground apparats. In an organizational report calling for a radical improvement in the methods and organization of its permanent "clandestine apparatus," the CP Colombia has done the same. This apparatus appears to combine

* WFTU Circular, 21 October 1955.

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not only the underground cadre network but also an intelligence network and "self-defense" units (i.e., strong-arm squads). Finally, the CP Japan has been reported to have more fully segregated its organization for secret activities from the "legal" Party.

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g. Exploitation of Soviet foreign policy line by the local CP to bring an end to repression of the Party by the government.

2. CP approach to non-Communists

a. Terms of CP appeal to non-Communist organizations for joint action: specific indications that the CP seeks collaboration strictly on the basis of limited local issues; appeals to Socialists on the basis of common doctrinal heritage; proposals for "exchange of experience " and liaison with Socialist organizations.

b. Specific examples of new "unity-in-action" techniques (e.g., realistic limitation of immediate objectives in strike actions).

c. Revival of dormant front organizations; creation of new fronts (especially on the basis of limited local issues and specialized interests); indications of special efforts to avoid public identification of fronts with established Communist policies.

d. Selective Communist approaches to individual businessmen and other influential individuals.

e. CP measures to ensure doctrinal and organizational integrity in dealing with non-Communist organizations and individuals. (E.g., what types of action are currently being cited as examples of "sectarianism," "revisionism," etc.? What practical measures are being taken to overcome deviationist tendencies?)

3. Clandestine activities.

a. Indications of increased Soviet/Satellite utilization of local Communist assets for intelligence and/or other purposes (e.g., to establish contact with non-Communist officials and influential

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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE: CURRENT PATTERNS

A CHECK LIST

Information on the following subjects is important for checking the hypotheses presented in this paper and for following the practical implementation of current Communist tactics on the national level. Especially helpful is information bearing on the question of change in Party policy and practice.

1. Basic tactical orientation.

   a. Focus of the CP attack: indications (policy statements, inner-Party discussion) of shift in Party's definition of its main enemy and of potential allies.

   b. Terms and intensity of promotion of "class struggle" issues; shift in CP propaganda and action toward exploitation of purely local issues.

   c. Shift in CP propaganda and doctrinal treatment of the United States as a state -- pre-Summit, post-Summit, and post-Foreign Ministers Conference; comparison of treatment of the United States with treatment of other "imperialist" powers.

   d. Terms of CP treatment of local capitalists.

   e. Developments in CP policy on armed struggle.

   f. What national or international historical precedents are being cited in Party policy formulations as applicable or inapplicable to current tactics? (Any observable distortions of historical fact in this connection are of interest.)

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individuals in order to facilitate East-West trade deals; to generate sentiment for changes in policy, etc ; to obtain background and/or control information on such target individuals; to serve as cut-outs and couriers for communication with such targets).

b. Indications of increased Soviet/Satellite support for CP leaders and collaborating non-Communists (e.g., business favors; provision of information which they can exploit in their own interest; introductions to other influential individuals, financial aid, etc.).

4. Organizational policies.

a. Organizational readjustments to the current international line (redistribution of cadres, creation of new posts, structural changes; revised methods of controlling work of cadres in non-Communist organizations).

b. Cadre policies: salvaging; purging "left-wingers" and weak functionaries; utilization of inactive members in "mass work;" utilization of purgees and defectors; application of "collective leadership" principles; recruitment and training policies in general.

c. Indications of increased coordination of the Communist movement on a regional basis.

d. Indications of changes (or continuation of past practices) in CPSU direction of the local CP; evidence that CPSU direction is being geared to better understanding of local realities (e.g., systematic collection of data on local conditions and Party problems for transmittal to CPSU and international fronts).

e. Increased separation of clandestine apparats from the CP organization which carries on "legal" work.

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5. Support by national Communist assets for the objectives of international Communist fronts (e.g., facilitating contacts between the international fronts and former affiliates and potential affiliates; other measures taken to swing target organizations toward collaboration with the international Communist fronts); conversely, indications that the national CP may be taking over functions heretofore handled by the international fronts (e.g., closer CP control over local affiliates of the international front; use of trainees of the WFTU central school to train local trade union cadres).

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